CONQUEST AND CONVERSION, WAR AND PEACE IN THE QURAN
CONQUEST AND CONVERSION, WAR AND PEACE IN THE QURAN
Beginning with the persecution of the early Muslim community by the idolatrous Quraysh, leading to exile in Abyssinia for some Muslims and followed by the emigration (hijrah) of many Muslims along with the Prophet from Makkah to Madinah, the subsequent military encounters with the Quraysh and their allies, and the final conquest of Arabia, the Prophet Muhammad encountered circumstances demanding that, in addition to his function as teacher and guide, he fulfil the role of military commander and head of state. From almost the very beginning of the Prophet’s career, Muslims had to come to terms with the question of the use of force, whether they were its victims or its agents, and as a comprehensive legal tradition, Islamic Law could not have remained silent on the question of war and peace
When discussing this subject, the use of the term jihād deserves special attention from the outset, as it has become deformed and misunderstood in much contemporary discourse. Linguistically jihād means “struggle,” “striving,” or “exertion,” though it is commonly and incorrectly translated “holy war” (a term originating in the Western tradition in the context of intra-Christian conflicts); in Arabic “holy war” would be equivalent to the term al-ḥarb al-muqaddas, which does not exist in classical Arabic. In the Islamic intellectual tradition, jihād means any struggle “in the way of God,” that is, in order to obey His Commands or accomplish His Will, which includes but is not limited to the just use of force
Even though in the Quran and Ḥadīth jihād is an idea comprising both the spiritual and the material, the inward and outward domains (often referred to as the “Greater Jihād” and the “Lesser Jihād,” respectively), in works of Islamic Law the word jihād as a technical term came to be understood as a reference to the taking up of arms “in the way of God,” though governed by strict rules that have counterparts in the Western concept of “just war.” That is to say, there is a distinction to be made between the word jihād as it is used in the Quran and the same term in the later legal tradition, much the same way the word fiqh and its cognates in the Quran refer to “understanding” in a general sense, but as technical terms came to refer later to law and jurisprudence. It is thus not infrequent that a chapter in a classical text on the virtues of taking up arms in the way of God will have the word jihād as part of its title, but jihād is also frequently used in Sufi texts to refer to the struggle in the spiritual life against one’s lower desires.
Like many important terms, jihād is equivocal; that is, its connotations can change depending on context: a jihād against one’s persecutors is not the same as a jihād against one’s passions. In fact, jihād has entered common English usage in a way almost indistinguishable from the word “crusade,” a term of purely Western origin with a similarly diverse history and a similar capacity to be misunderstood and misapplied. Muslims in an Islamic context could have used the word jihād and expected their audience to understand its constituent elements, whether these were the laws governing fighting an external threat or the spiritual techniques used to purify the soul and bring it closer to God. However, the simple use of jihād as a way of describing what Muslims believe about conquest, conversion, and violence is worse than meaningless in an intellectual and cultural environment in which specifics regarding such questions need to be spelled out with the utmost precision and care, rather than masked under catchall terms that are useful only in a context where their meaning is well known and generally agreed upon.
To understand the Quran’s use of jihād, it is necessary to recall that for many years, during the period in which the Prophet preached in his hometown of Makkah, Muslims were forbidden to respond with force to the persecution, suppression, embargoes, and even deaths that they endured. Yet even during this period Muslims were commanded by the Quran to “strive” (jihād): So obey not the disbelievers, but strive against them by means of it with a great striving (25:52); Then indeed thy Lord, for those who emigrated after being oppressed, then strove and were patient, surely thy Lord thereafter is Forgiving, Merciful (16:110). The Prophet himself also taught the virtues of nonviolent forms of struggle, saying, “The best struggle (jihād) is to speak the truth before a tyrannical ruler.” 1 To a group returning from a battle he said, “You have returned from the lesser struggle (jihād) to the greater struggle,” 2 which most Muslims have understood to mean returning from physical fighting to resume struggling to gain perfection on the spiritual path. He also said, “Shall I tell you of your best deed, the most pleasing to your King, the loftiest in your ranks, better than the giving of gold and silver, and better than meeting your enemy in battle, beheading him whilst he beheads you? The remembrance of God
The Use of Force
After the emigration from Makkah to Madinah, Muslims were given permission to engage in battle against those who threatened the nascent Islamic community, and most jurists consider the first verses allowing the taking up of arms to be the following:
Truly God defends those who believe. Truly God loves not any ungrateful traitor. Permission is granted to those who are fought, because they have been wronged—and truly God is able to help them—who were expelled from their homes without right, only for saying, “Our Lord is God.” Were it not for God’s repelling people, some by means of others, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, wherein God’s Name is mentioned much, would have been destroyed. And God will surely help those who help Him—truly God is Strong, Mighty—who, were We to establish them upon the earth, would perform the prayer, give the alms, and enjoin right and forbid wrong. And unto God is the end of all affairs. (22:38–41)
Three points are of special significance in connection with this passage. First, the purpose of force (repelling some by means of others) is ultimately the maintenance of religion (the remembrance of God’s Name in houses of worship). Second, this protection is not limited to Muslims, but extends to churches, synagogues, and monasteries, meaning that God acts to preserve authentic religion as such. Third, the use of force by Muslims is framed as a defensive action in response to wrongs committed offensively against them
Among the key Quranic verses pertaining to war and physical conflict are 2:190–94, 216–17, 244, 256; 3:116–56; 4:75; 5:13; 8:5, 38–39, 61; 9:1–15, 29, 111; 10:109; 22:39–40, 52; 42:40; 47:4; 60:8–9, though there are others. These verses merit careful reading in full and in their proper context, and readers are encouraged to explore the commentary in this volume on these passages. They outline the conditions under which Muslims may engage in battle and the reasons for which they are allowed to fight: because they have been wronged and expelled from their homes (22:39–40); because they have been persecuted, which is seen as graver than slaying, and threatened in order to make them renounce their religion (2:217). Under these conditions, they are commanded to fight and even kill their enemies, and yet if they desist, then there is no enmity save against the wrongdoers (2:193) and what is past will be forgiven them (8:38). Moreover, it is important to remember that the relevant passages regarding the use of force are not limited to those that describe fighting or contain specific commands and prohibitions regarding war and conflict. The moral landscape of the Quran is unambiguously against religious persecution and military aggression and in favor of justice and forgiveness as well as restraint, and one cannot consider the rules and justifications for the use of force without consideration of the Quran’s general view of other religions and its overall social teachings.
Coercion in Matters of Religion
In order to understand whether and how the use of force can be applied in religious matters, one can begin by examining verses that outline the scope of the Prophet’s mission, such as 42:48: And if they turn away, We sent thee not as a keeper over them. Naught is incumbent upon thee, save the proclamation. Similar verses include 88:21–23; 13:40; and 5:92. Some of these passages are Madinan, which means that they were revealed after permission was given to the Muslim community by God to struggle with and confront the enemy through force of arms when necessary. Another such verse is, There is no coercion in religion. Sound judgment has become clear from error (2:256). This verse was directed at Muslims who wanted to convert their children from Judaism or Christianity to Islam or, according to another interpretation, at those who sought pardon for their children who continued to live among a Jewish tribe that was exiled for planning to assassinate the Prophet. According to the first interpretation, one cannot be coerced into becoming a Muslim, and according to the second, one cannot be coerced into remaining non-Muslim, meaning that those children of Muslims who chose to remain with the enemies of Muslims did so of their own free will.
These passages are in a seeming tension with a ḥadīth of the Prophet stating, “I have been commanded to fight the people until they bear witness that there is no god but God and Muhammad is God’s Messenger, perform the prayer, and pay the alms. When they have done this, their blood and property are safe from me, except by the right of Islam and their reckoning with God.” 4 This ḥadīth raises questions regarding those to whom the word “people” in the ḥadīth refers, why they are to be fought, and whether it means that Islam should be spread by force.
The vast majority of the scholars of Quranic exegesis and Islamic Law have always held that the command to preach peacefully and to never coerce anyone in their choice of religion—a message found throughout the Quran—was never changed and continued to hold sway through the end of the Prophet’s life and after and still holds true today. For the majority of traditional scholars, the maximum possible scope for “the people” in the aforementioned ḥadīth is limited to those with whom the Prophet was engaged in conflict at the time, meaning that “the people” does not refer to all people everywhere but was limited strictly to the pagan Arabs who had been his unrelenting enemies and persecutors. Also, the verb “to fight” (qātala) in Arabic implies that one is in mutual contention with someone, not in a mode of aggression.
Questions also arise in connection with the so-called Sword Verse, 9:5: When the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wheresoever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent, and perform the prayer and give the alms, then let them go their way. Truly God is Forgiving, Merciful. The following verse reads: And if any of the idolaters seek asylum with thee, grant him asylum until he hears the Word of God. Then convey him to his place of safety. That is because they are a people who know not (9:6). This second verse commands Muslims to receive idolaters if they seek asylum, to preach the truth to them, and then to let them go safely. It sets no condition that they repent and accept Islam. Some have posited, without much support in the principles of exegesis, that the second verse is abrogated by the first, meaning that the legally binding nature of 9:5 overturns that of 9:6. However, a straightforward reading shows that becoming Muslims is not a condition for the asylum seekers’ safe return. Rather, these two verses present not one, but two possibilities for non-Muslims to escape armed conflict with the Muslim community: the first is to accept Islam, as mentioned in the first verse, and the second is to seek asylum with Muslims, as mentioned in the second verse. Moreover, as mentioned in connection with some of the verses cited earlier, this passage was interpreted traditionally as pertaining only to Arabia and not to the whole world.
The invocation of “abrogation” as it concerns passages relating to the use of force is a persistent issue in Quranic commentary. Some jurists tend to uphold the opinion that verses permissive of conflict “abrogate” or cancel the binding force of those verses that discourage or limit it, in extreme cases (as in 9:5) holding that a verse abrogates the one immediately following it in the text. Because of the consequential nature of verses related to the use of force, it is worth remembering that in almost all cases abrogation is a contested matter. Most jurists accept that abrogation exists in the Quran, but there is a wide range of opinion as to its scope and application (see 2:106c).
Treaties and Treaty Peoples
Treaties are an important dimension of Islamic Law as they pertain to war and peace. From the time he took political power in Madinah until his death, the Prophet entered into treaties with several tribes on the Arabian Peninsula, among them Jewish tribes such as Banū Qurayẓah and also the polytheistic Quraysh. Among the key verses dealing with treaties are 8:56–61 and 9:7–16, beginning with 9:7: If they remain true to you, remain true to them. Truly God loves the reverent. Observing established treaties with non-Muslim polytheists meant that the Muslim community was willing, and indeed commanded, to live in a state of peace with its neighbors regardless of their religion. When Muslims were commanded to fight those who broke their treaties, the reason inviting retaliation was the resulting threat to the Islamic community and not the identity of the treaty breakers.
Moreover, the Quran does not allow Muslims to wage war on those who pose no threat at all: Had God willed, He could have given them authority over you, and then surely they would have fought you. So if they withdraw from you, and do not fight you, and offer peace, God allows you no way against them (4:90); and, If they incline toward peace, incline thou toward it, and trust in God (8:61). In some cases, such as the surprise attack at Khaybar and the campaigns of Muʾtah and Tabūk, the Prophet and his Companions set out in an offensive posture, attacking first. However, these were not instances of aggression, but what modern international law might call preemptive (not “preventive”) selfdefense. In the case of Khaybar, the Prophet was taking action against a tribe that was secretly plotting to attack the Muslims. In the case of Muʾtah, an emissary of the Prophet was killed by tribes to the north who were under the protection of the Byzantines, and in the campaign of Tabūk the Muslims took to the field based on information that the Byzantines were planning attacks of their own
Indeed, the Arabic saying, “When the Byzantines are not campaigned against, they campaign,” describes the state of much of the world before the UN Charter, the Nuremberg Principles, and the Geneva Conventions, and in many cases after these agreements as well. Maintaining security was often a matter of active defense to maintain boundaries, and in the absence of an explicit treaty one group could not expect to be left alone if it left others to prepare to attack. Borders were not established facts of international agreement, but rather were usually determined by how much territory one group could effectively defend. Conquest as such was not seen as an international crime (indeed, there was no such concept in premodern history), and until the last century war was seen as a legitimate instrument of national policy
In their wake Muslim armies left large portions of the lands they conquered predominantly non-Muslim for decades or even centuries, as we see in the cases of Syria and Persia, since the expansion of Islamic rule did not require the expansion of the Muslim population. Indeed, on occasion Christians fought alongside Muslims during the early conquests, and Jews fought alongside Muslims in Andalusia. Moreover, most of the Islamic world was never conquered at all, but became Muslim through the example of saintly figures, preaching, or simple contact with pious Muslim merchants. Had Muslims desired to convert populations by force or expel them, the Christian and Jewish communities that have historically lived in the Islamic world and continue to do so until the present day would not exist. A better example of “religious” conquest would be the Christian conquest of southern Spain in 1492, after which not a single active mosque or Muslim community was allowed to exist in Spain until the latter part of the fourteenth/twentieth century.
In Islamic Law, the People of the Book (usually Jews and Christians, but in practice also Zoroastrians, Hindus, and others) who live under the political rule of Muslims are called ahl al-dhimmah, literally “people of treaty.” Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which a given people may be considered dhimmīs, or “treaty people.” In one case, dhimmīs live among the Muslim population and share the same streets, markets, and neighborhoods. In the second case, dhimmīs live in a separate area and run most of their own affairs. Naturally there are variations that lie between these two categories, but these are the two general types. Crucial to understanding these arrangements is the fact that a treaty people were not just a religious community, but constituted a political and legal unit in relation to the Muslim community
In the first case, dhimmīs live under the laws and within the framework provided by the Islamic state, but with complete autonomy with regard to their religious and cultural matters such as education and family law. The protected people are not required to contribute to the military protection of the state, but are subject instead to an “indemnity,” or a tax specific to them, most commonly known as the jizyah, but it has other names as well (dhimmīs do not pay the Islamic alms, or zakāh, which is required of Muslims). This common arrangement lasted in many parts of the Islamic world, particularly in the Ottoman Empire, until the fourteenth/twentieth century. Historically other rules were imposed on the treaty peoples, such as a prohibition against missionary activity and limits on the construction of new houses of worship.
In the second case, the dhimmī state agrees to exist in peace with the Islamic state and not help or support any enemy of Islam. Examples of this include the Prophet’s arrangement with the people of Bahrain, who were Zoroastrians, and with the Christians of Najran. Under such an arrangement, the people remain completely autonomous and run their own affairs. They remain under the protection of the Islamic state, with no responsibility to provide active protection in return. The Islamic state has no right to any of their wealth or property except for the jizyah, or “indemnity.” These kinds of agreements were commonplace during the early conquests and even later in Islamic history
The verse that institutes the jizyah is 9:29: Fight those who believe not in God and in the Last Day, and who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who follow not the Religion of Truth among those who were given the Book, till they pay the jizyah with a willing hand, being humbled. The phrase being humbled (wa-hum ṣāghirūn), which can also mean “in a state of humility or lowness,” has been interpreted and applied in more than one way; some take it to mean simply “as the minor or subject party,” and others restrict the reference to those from whom Muslims had experienced prior hostility and enmity. Indeed, some commentators note that this verse does not seem to describe all People of the Book, though most jurists have interpreted it to apply to the People of the Book generally when they enter into a treaty relationship with a Muslim state. In Islamic history some rulers have enforced a kind of humiliation to accompany the paying of the jizyah by the dhimmī communities, but in doing so they have generally gone against the most established Islamic precedent and legal opinion. Neither the Prophet nor the early Caliphs humiliated dhimmīs during the payment of the jizyah; sometimes they allowed it to be called “charity” and always required that it be collected with gentleness.
Modern observers looking at the institutions of dhimmah and jizyah often interpret them through the prism of familiar concepts of citizenship and civil society, but since a religious community in Islamic Law delineated historically a political community as well (as it did in the Ottoman Empire, for example), the historical virtues and abuses of such institutions are more properly judged according to an idea of multiple religio-political communities occupying the same geographic space. Although dhimmīs paid an indemnity (jizyah), they were not required to serve in the armed forces, and although there were limits placed on their ability to expand and preach to those outside their communities, they were granted significant autonomy to run their own affairs. The rules on the treatment of Jews and Christians (which extended in practice to other religions as well) are often seen as placing a limit on some of their rights, but it should be recalled that, in establishing a maximum, Islamic Law also established a minimum. Whatever transactional limitations the treaty peoples experienced, embracing Islam under threat of force was rare in Islamic history and has no warrant in the Quran with the exception of the pagan Arabs of the Prophet’s time, who, in the view of most jurists, were not given the option of becoming a treaty people.
The Conduct of War
Islamic Law, basing itself on the Quran and Ḥadīth, devotes considerable attention to the conduct of war. Its principles are based upon such texts as 2:190: And fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but do not transgress. Truly God loves not the transgressors; and a ḥadīth in which the Prophet said, “Do not kill weak old men, small children, or women.” 5 The canonical books of Ḥadīth record that when the Prophet dispatched his armies, he would command them to fight in the way of God, but not to act brutally, kill children, women, or old men, mutilate the dead, or mutilate animals. Many similar injunctions were given by the early Caliphs and were expanded upon in the formation of classical Islamic Law. Beyond the sparing of noncombatants, Muslims were explicitly ordered not to cut down fruit-bearing trees, kill animals except for the purposes of sustenance, harm monks and hermits, or go beyond certain bounds even in the case of combatants (mutilation, etc.). These commands, which also extend to the rights of animals and plants and the protection of the natural environment, are part of a binding law, not merely a theory of just war. Muslims are just as obliged to obey these prohibitions, in all conditions, as they are to refrain from wine and adultery.
Limits of Conquest Having surveyed questions regarding the legitimate use of force and its bearing on religious identity, we might consider the question of whether the Quran sanctions the use of force by Muslims against non-Muslims who pose no active, imminent, or even likely threat with the goal of asserting sovereignty over them. That is to say, does the Quran enjoin Muslims to attempt to gain political control over non-Muslims even while allowing them to remain non-Muslim as ahl aldhimmah, or “people of treaty,” and does it do so for no other reason than that they are non-Muslim? As described above, the Quran always frames the use of force in terms of moral principles, whether it be a response to expulsion, religious persecution, or threat of attack, not to mention basic self-defense. Why, then, did Muslims take control of territory beyond the Arabian Peninsula? Why should Muslims have set out to conquer more lands at all? A straightforward argument could be made in support of fighting to conquer Makkah, the town from which the Muslims had been forced to emigrate, and one could also justify the taking of the territory of other tribes who had previously allied with the Quraysh and consistently displayed hostility toward the Muslim community. But did the early Muslim community have the moral authority to conquer the remainder of Arabia? Byzantium? Persia?
The decades after the death of the Prophet were a tumultuous time, and on questions related to war and politics it is difficult to speak of a consensus in the Muslim community. However, there was an explicit sense among at least some in the early community that, when they fought, they were fighting not for hegemony and conquest for their own sake or to make the world’s population Muslim, but for the survival of the religion itself. During one of the early civil wars, ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar, the son of the second Caliph, was asked why he was not fighting, and he said, “Son of my brother, Islam is built upon five things: belief in God and His Messenger, the five prayers, the fast of Ramadan, giving the alms, and performing the ḥajj.” His interlocutor then quoted to him 49:9: If two parties among the believers fall to fighting, make peace between them. And if one of them aggresses against the other, fight those who aggress until they return to God’s Command. And if they return, make peace between them with justice and act equitably. Truly God loves the just. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿUmar responded, “We did that during the time of the Prophet, when Islam was trifling, when a man would be tried regarding his religion, and they would either kill him or torture him. But then Islam became great, and there was no trial (fitnah).”
Though uttered in a specific context, this statement conditions the use of force on the prospect of the survival of the religion and the threat of extreme religious persecution to the point of forced conversion. The precariousness of the Muslims’ situation in the early days is alluded to in such verses as 8:26: And remember when you were few, deemed weak in the land, fearing that the people would snatch you away. Then He sheltered you, and strengthened you with His help, and provided you with good things, that haply you may give thanks. The Quran also tells the believers not to be concerned about the fact that their enemies are free to come and go in the land (3:196; 40:4), while they are weak and live in a state of fear, because the final fate for disbelievers is Hell.
One could argue that to the Companions it was not at all obvious that Islam as a religion could survive if they did not take an active role in establishing a political, military, and cultural environment robust and resilient enough to protect it; in those early times the first generation pushed the borders of the Islamic political entity for fear that the spiritual message of Islam would not last long in the world if they did not do so. They did not live on an island. Despite the somewhat persistent notion that the Arabs lived in a land that was a backwater ignored by the civilizations around it, Arabia, or at least the Ḥijāz, was very much connected to the rest of the ancient world, and the early Muslim community often felt the concrete threat of the Byzantines and Persians, through their Ghassanid and Lakhmid allies to the north, for example. (Recall the maxim mentioned earlier, “When the Byzantines are not campaigned against, they campaign.”) In one incident a prominent opponent of the Prophet is recorded as having conspired with the Byzantines and as part of his plot built a mosque or place of prayer in Madinah known as the “mosque of harm,” spoken of in 9:107: And as for those who established a mosque for harm and disbelief, and to divide the believers, and to be an outpost for those who made war on God and His Messenger before, they will surely swear, “We desire only what is best.” But God bears witness that truly they are liars
But does Islamic Law treat the entire world as hostile until conquered? The often invoked delineation between the “Abode of Islam” (dār al-islām) and the “Abode of War” (dār al-ḥarb), a terminology not found in the Quran or Ḥadīth, is a relic of a period of history when empires or kingdoms could go to war at any time in the absence of a treaty. This is precisely what “Abode of War” meant: an area that had not signed a treaty and hence was a potential aggressor. However, the Abode of War and the Abode of Islam, even in the context of this taxonomy in classical Islamic Law, were never a simple bifurcation, since there were also the “Abode of Treaty” or the “Abode of Safety” (dār al-ṣulḥ or dār al-amn), referring to lands with whom a treaty or pact existed, and other designations to describe the political status of a territory.
Although contemporary observers can and should judge the morality of the use of force by premodern caliphs, kings, and emperors, we cannot use in that judgment the standards under which most of us were born. In 1928 the KelloggBriand pact was the first major systematic attempt in an international context to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. Previously, what protected states against each other were military deterrence and treaties. Over the course of the fourteenth/twentieth century, the Nuremberg Principles, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Geneva Conventions laid the foundation for current international law, which, needless to say, is not always followed by nations in the world even today. These agreements constitute binding treaties between the signatories. They make military aggression between states illegal and, among other things, forbid the acquisition of territory by war, define war crimes during the conduct of war, and govern the treatment of prisoners, civilians, and combatants. In a certain sense the international system renders the default status of the entire world the Abode of Treaty.
Although it is true that some authorities throughout Islam’s long history have interpreted the Islamic law of war as giving Muslims unqualified permission to conquer and expand into territory controlled by non-Muslims or in extreme cases to bring the entire world under their dominion, this has remained a minority view. The complex history of the first generation of Muslim conquest can be interpreted more plausibly as a stage in the history of Islam when the future existence of the religion was far from certain and when expansion meant survival.
Indeed, it is worth considering whether the Companions of the Prophet had any particular taste for conquest for its own sake. The Quran seems to suggest in 2:216 that they did not: Fighting has been prescribed for you, though it is hateful to you. But it may be that you hate a thing though it be good for you, and it may be that you love a thing though it be evil for you. Some commentators note the war-weariness of many Companions and their desire to return to a peaceful life in the homes from which they had been expelled, understanding the Quran to promise in 24:55 that fighting will come to an end: God has promised those among you who believe and perform righteous deeds that He will surely make them vicegerents upon the earth, as He caused those before them to be vicegerents, and that He will establish for them their religion, which He has approved for them, and that He will surely change them from a state of fear to security.
The foregoing remarks have been focused upon the first generation of Muslims, whose example Muslims consider normative, but even in that generation matters are complicated by the intra-Muslim conflict that began with the Wars of Repudiation (riddah), in which many tribes of Arabia tried to secede from central rule in Madinah, as well as by the later assassination of the third Caliph, ʿUthmān, and the ensuing civil wars. If, for the sake of simplicity, we focus on the reigns of the first two Caliphs, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, we note that these were not men who employed force for the sake of glory in this world, but were humble and self-effaced. Abū Bakr walked out on foot with an army, to the embarrassment of a younger general. ʿUmar famously walked into Jerusalem, because it was his servant’s time to ride. Nor were they zealots whose asceticism was a mask for fanaticism. Abū Bakr set down strict rules for fighting. ʿUmar, for all his legendary brusqueness, took control of Jerusalem with proverbial gallantry and chivalry. They were often quite ambivalent about their conquests and the exercise of power. For example, far from being delighted at acquiring the wealth of the Persians, ʿUmar was quite dismayed at what it might do to the souls of his soldiers. Focusing on Abū Bakr and ʿUmar is useful not because the motivations of the first two Caliphs were different from those of the third and fourth, but because it allows us to see the issue unclouded by the theological and political issues that arose after them as a consequence of the civil wars sparked initially by the assassination of ʿUthmān
Those who are fair-minded about Islamic history must be ready to acknowledge, at least in principle, that in particular historical situations the drive to expand Islamic rule was not completely justifiable according to the moral structure outlined in the Quran, but was at least partially the result of ordinary caprice, or hawā, to use Quranic terminology. It is true that throughout Islam’s history large parts of the Islamic world became Muslim at the hands of saintly figures, but some territory was also conquered by tyrants and rulers who could be accurately described using the words of the queen of Sheba in 27:34: Verily kings, when they enter a town, corrupt it, and make the most honorable of its people the most abased. Such a mixed history is something the Islamic world has in common with every other major civilization. Accepting this view enables contemporary observers to interpret the actions of the early community based upon the ethical principles laid out in the Quran and the Ḥadīth and provides a framework by which to judge properly whether to celebrate or condemn the conduct of later Muslims when they resorted to force or military action.
Finally, any impulse toward world domination and the imposition of unitary rule by one religion, Muslim or otherwise, over all people should surely be tempered by such unequivocal verses as 5:48:
And We have sent down unto thee the Book in truth, confirming the Book that came before it, and as a protector over it. So judge between them in accordance with that which God has sent down, and follow not their caprices away from the truth that has come unto thee. For each among you We have appointed a law and a way. And had God willed, He would have made you one community, but [He willed otherwise], that He might try you in that which He has given you. So vie with one another in good deeds. Unto God shall be your return all together, and He will inform you of that wherein you differ.
In more than one place the Quran assumes the existence of multiple religious communities and even describes the Muslim community’s role in relation to them, addressing Muslims in 2:143: Thus did We make you a middle community, that you may be witnesses for mankind and that the Messenger may be a witness for you (cf. 22:78). This verse and those that mention that God could have made humanity one community (e.g., 5:48) do not call upon Muslims to realize dominance or even to strive for the spread of Islam among all peoples. This principle was acknowledged by many jurists who described most or all of the verses in the Quran pertaining to the use of force as applying to those enemies whom the Muslims were facing during the time of the revelation, although they also provide guidelines for conduct in other situations to come later in history. Sometimes classical commentators dismissed openly the idea that the Quran intended for the world to be conquered by Islam, if only because such an event had not in fact taken place and the existence of such a stated or predicted goal in the Quran would thus have been theologically problematic.
Remembering the Tradition
Though the Quran is the first source for Islamic Law, and hence for any law of war, it has always been understood in light of its overall teachings on right and wrong as well as the life and teachings of the Prophet (the Sunnah) and the scholarly tradition since then. Our contemporary situation has highlighted the importance of having recourse to the insights provided by the learned tradition of Muslim jurists and theologians as well as the danger of reading parts of the legal teachings of the Quran without regard for the whole law itself, although in some important cases Muslim jurists themselves have not always agreed on the application of the Quran to matters of war and some have arguably gone beyond what the plain sense of the text allows. Moreover, today some extremist critics and proponents of Islam have often removed and continue to remove verses of the Quran from their context and have dismissed (through ignorance or misdirection) over a thousand years of legal doctrine and interpretation.
In regulating war, Islamic Law does not espouse belligerence, any more than regulating sexuality encourages licentiousness. Yet Islam’s ideal of peace does not make it pacifist, and thus a proper understanding depends on avoiding the extremes of viewing Islam as an inherently warlike religion or of trying to portray it as a quietist one. Rather, its ideal is the establishment of harmony based on justice to the extent possible. The Islamic rules of war and peace have been followed throughout Islamic history with varying degrees of success, and in a minority of cases were openly violated, but anecdotal evidence of such cases should not distract from the Quranic sources and principles codified later in the legal tradition and followed in most instances in Islamic history.
Many Muslim jurists have conceived the fundamental objectives of Islamic Law to be the maintenance and protection of life, religion, mind, lineage or dignity, and property, and they view these five as indispensable rights that individuals need in order to live within a just society. As part of Islamic Law, the rules governing the use of force are directed toward those very same principles and are constrained by them. These principles prohibit Muslims from becoming brutal aggressors, without leaving them defenseless in the face of danger or attack, thus preserving and protecting these fundamental rights, and are predicated upon the striving for justice, the protection of innocents, and the acceptance of other religions. This is the least, and the most, that can be expected from any law when it comes to war.
(Source: Carner K. Dagli)
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