7. NASKH (ABROGATION)
Literally, naskh means ‘obliteration’, such as in nasakhat al-rih athar al-mashy, meaning ‘the wind obliterated the footprint’. Naskh also means transcription or transfer (al-naql wa al-tahwil) of something from one state to another while its essence remains unchanged. In this sense, ‘naskh’ has been used in the Qur’anic ayah which reads: inna kunna nastansikhu ma kuntum ta’malun, that is, ‘verily We write all that you do’ (al-Jathiyah, 45:29). This usage of naskh can also be seen in the familiar Arabic expressions, tanasukh al-arwah (reincarnation), and tanasukh al-mawarith, the transfer of inheritance from persons to persons. The ulema have differed as to which of these two meanings of naskh is the literal (haqiqi) as opposed to that which might be metaphorical (majazi). Some ulema, including Abu Bakr al-Baqillani and al-Ghazali, have held that ‘naskh’ is a homonym and applies equally to either of its two meanings. According to the majority view, however, obliteration (al-raf wa al-izalah) is the primary, and transcription/transfer is the secondary, meaning of naskh.
Naskh may be defined as the suspension or replacement of one Shari’ah ruling by another, provided that the latter is of a subsequent origin, and that the two rulings are enacted separately from one another. According to this definition, naskh operates with regard to the rules of Shari’ah only, a proviso which precludes the application of naskh to rules that are founded in rationality (aql) alone. The hukm, or ruling, in this definition not only includes commands and prohibitions but also the three intermediate categories of recommended, reprehensible and mubah. The requirement that the two rulings must be separate means that each must be enacted in a separate text. For when they both occur in one and the same passage, it is likely that one complements or qualifies the other, or that one may embody a condition or an exception to the other.
Abrogation applies almost exclusively to the Qur’an and the Sunnah; its application to ijma` and qiyas, as will later be explained, has been generally overruled. And even then, the application of naskh to the Qur’an and Sunnah is confined, in terms of time, to one period only, which is the lifetime of the Prophet. There is, in other words, no naskh after the demise of the Prophet. But during his lifetime, there were instances when some of the rulings of the Qur’an and Sunnah were either totally or partially repealed by subsequent rulings. This was due mainly to the change of circumstances in the life of the community and the fact that the revelation of the Qur’an spanned a period of twenty-three years. The ulema are unanimous on the occurrence of naskh in the Sunnah. It is, however, with regard to the occurrence of naskh in the Qur’an on which there is some disagreement both in principle as well as on the number of instances in which naskh is said to have occurred.
Abrogation is by and large a Madinese phenomenon which occurred as a result of the changes that the Muslim community encountered following the Prophet’s migration to Madinah. Certain rules were introduced, at the early stage of the advent of Islam, which were designed to win over the hearts of the people. An example of this is the number of daily prayers which was initially fixed at two but was later increased to five. Similarly, mut`ah, or temporary marriage, was initially permitted but was subsequently prohibited when the Prophet migrated to Madinah. These and similar changes were effected in the nusus at a time when the Muslim community acquired sovereign authority and fresh legislation was deemed necessary to regulate its life in the new environment of Madinah.
Some Hanafi and Mu’tazili scholars have held the view that ijma can abrogate a ruling of the Qur’an or the Sunnah. The proponents of this view have claimed that it was due to ijma` that `Umar b. al-Khattab discontinued the share of the mu’allafah al-qulub in the zakah. These were persons of influence whose friendship and co-operation was deemed to be beneficial to Islam. The Qur’an assigned them a share in zakah (al-Tawbah, 9:60), but this was discontinued apparently because the mujtahidun of the time reached a unanimous agreement to that effect. The correct view, however, is that owing to differences of opinion that are recorded on this matter, no ijma` could be claimed to have materialized. Besides, the majority of ulema have held that ijma` neither abrogates nor can be abrogated itself; and at any rate ijma cannot abrogate a nass of the Qur’an or the Sunnah. For a valid ijma’ may never be concluded in contradiction to the Qur’an or the Sunnah in the first place. Al- Amidi elaborates this as follows: the hukm which the ijma` seeks to repeal might be founded in a nass, another ijma, or qiyas. The first is not possible, for the ijma` which seeks to abrogate the nass of Qur’an or Sunnah is either based on an indication (dalil) or not. If it is not based on any dalil, then it is likely to be erroneous, and if it is based on a dalil this could either be a nass or qiyas. If the basis (sanad) of ijma` is a qiyas, then abrogation is not permissible (as we shall explain later); and if the sanad of ijma` is a nass, then abrogation is by that nass, not by ijma`. The share of the mu’allafah al-qulub was discontinued by Umar b. al-Khattab on the grounds of the Shari’ah-oriented policy (al-siyasah al- shar`iyyah), which is explained in the caliph’s widely-quoted phrase that `God has exalted Islam, which is no longer in need of their favor.’
According to the general rule a Qur’anic nass or a Mutawatir Hadith cannot be abrogated by a weaker Hadith, by ijma’ or by qiyas. For they are not of equal authority to the nass. This is, in fact, the main argument in support of the rule, already referred to, that no abrogation of the nusus is possible after the demise of the Prophet, for the Qur’an and the Sunnah ceased to be revealed with his demise. Since nothing weaker than the Qur’an and Sunnah can abrogate anything in either of these sources, abrogation, to all intents and purposes, came to an end with the death of the Prophet. Ijma`, qiyas and ijtihad, being weaker in comparison to the nusus, cannot abrogate the rules of divine revelations.
It is in view of these and similar considerations that the ulema have arrived at the general rule that ijma’ can neither abrogate anything nor be abrogated itself. Abrogation in other words is generally not relevant to ijma`. The preferable view, however, is that ijma’ cannot abrogate the rulings of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or of another ijmawhich is founded in the Qur’an, Sunnah, or qiyas. However, a subsequent ijma’ may abrogate an existing ijma` which might be founded in considerations of public interest, or maslahah mursalah. This would in theory appear to be the only situation in which ijma` could operate as an abrogator.
And finally, since the principal function of qiyas is to extend the rulings of the Qur’an and Sunnah to similar cases, it may never operate in the opposite direction, namely, to repeal a text of the Qur’an or Sunnah. Broadly speaking, qiyas has no place in the theory of naskh: qiyas cannot be an abrogator, basically because it is weaker than the nass and ijma and thus cannot abrogate either. Nor can qiyas itself be abrogated, for qiyas is normally based on a textual ruling and is bound to remain valid for as long as the original text remains valid. It is thus inconceivable that a qiyas be abrogated while the text to which it is founded remains in force. Furthermore, an established analogy is not exactly abrogated by a subsequent analogy. If the first analogy is based on the Qur’an, or Sunnah, then a conflicting analogy would presumably be erroneous. Besides, the two analogies can coexist and be counted as two ijtihadi opinions without the one necessarily abrogating the other. For the rule concerning ijtihad is that the mujtahid deserves a reward for his effort even if his ijtihad is incorrect. In short, naskh basically applies to binding proofs, and qiyas is not one of them.
In his Risalah, Imam Shafi’i has maintained the view that naskh is not a form of annulment (ilgha’); it is rather a suspension or termination of one ruling by another. Naskh in this sense is a form of explanation (bayan) which does not entail a total rejection of the original ruling. Naskh is explanatory in the sense that it tells us of the termination of a particular ruling, the manner and the time of its termination, whether the whole of a ruling or only a part of it is terminated, and of course, the new ruling which is to take its place. However, the majority of ulema do not accept the view that naskh is a form of bayan. The fact that naskh terminates and puts an end to a ruling differentiates it from bayan, and when a ruling is terminated, it cannot be explained.
There may be instances of conflict between two texts which, after scrutiny, may turn out to be apparent rather than real, and it may be possible to reconcile them and to eliminate the conflict. One of the two texts may be general (`amm) and the other specific (khass), in which case the rules of interpretation and takhsis (specification) must be applied so as to eliminate the conflict as far as possible. If the two texts cannot be reconciled, then the one which is stronger in respect of authenticity (thubut) is to be preferred. If, for example, there is a conflict between the Qur’an and a solitary Hadith, the latter is weaker and must therefore give way to the Qur’an. The solitary, or Ahad, Hadith may also be abrogated by the Mutawatir, the Mashhur, or another Ahad, which is dearer in meaning or which is supported by a stronger chain of narration (isnad). But if the two texts happen to be equal on all of these points, then the prohibitory text is to be given priority over the permissive. Furthermore, in all instances of conflict, it is essential to determine the time factor. If this can be determined, then the later in time abrogates the earlier. The chronological sequence between the two rulings can, however, only be established by means of reliable reports, not by rational argumentation or analogical reasoning.
As a general rule, naskh is not applicable to the `perspicuous’ texts of the Qur’an and Hadith, known as muhkamat. A text of this nature is often worded in such a way as to preclude the possibility of repeal. There are also certain subjects to which abrogation does not apply. Included among these are provisions pertaining to the attributes of God, belief in the principles of the faith, and the doctrine of tawhid and the hereafter, which could not be subjected to abrogation. Another subject is the Shari’ah of Islam itself, which is the last of the revealed laws and can never be abrogated in its entirety. The ulema are also in agreement that rational matters and moral truths such as the virtue of doing justice or being good to one’s parents, and vices such as the enormity of telling lies, are not changeable and are therefore not open to abrogation. Thus a vice cannot be turned into a virtue or a virtue into a vice by the application of naskh. Similarly the nusus of the Qur’an and Sunnah which relate the occurrence of certain events in the past are not open to abrogation. To give an example, the following Qur’anic text is not amenable to the application of naskh: `As for the Thamud, they were destroyed by a terrible storm, whereas the `Ad were destroyed by a furious and violent wind’ (al-Haqqah, 69:5-6). To apply naskh to such reports would imply the attribution of lying to its source, which cannot be entertained.
To summarise the foregoing: no abrogation can take place unless the following conditions are satisfied. First, that the text itself has not precluded the possibility of abrogation. An example of this is the Qur’anic provision concerning persons who are convicted of slanderous accusation (qadhf) that they may never be admitted as witnesses (al-Nur, 24:4). Similarly the Hadith which proclaims that `jihad shall remain valid till the day of resurrection’, obviously precludes the possibility of abrogating the permanent validity of jihad. Second, that the subject is open to the possibility of repeal. Thus the attributes of God and the principles of belief, moral virtues and rational truths, etc., are not open to abrogation. Third, that the abrogating text is of a later origin than the abrogated. Fourth, that the two texts are of equal strength in regard to authenticity (thubut) and meaning (dalalah). Thus a textual ruling of the Qur’an may be abrogated either by another Qur’anic text of similar strength or by a Mutawatir Hadith, and, according to the Hanafis, even by a Mashhur Hadith, as the latter is almost as strong as the Mutawatir. By the same token, one Mutawatir Hadith may abrogate another. However, according to the preferred (rajih) view, neither the Qur’an nor the Mutawatir Hadith may be abrogated by a solitary Hadith. According to Imam Shafi’i, however, the Sunnah, whether as Mutawatir or Ahad, may not abrogate the Qur’an. Fifth, that the two texts are genuinely in conflict and can in no way be reconciled with one another. And lastly, that the two texts are separate and are not related to one another in the sense of one being the condition (shart), qualification (wasf) or exception (istithna’) to the other. For when this is the case, the issue is likely to be one of specification (takhsis), or qualification (taqyid) rather than abrogation.
by M. H. Kamali.
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