7.3. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST NASKH
As already stated, the ulema are not unanimous over the occurrence of naskh in the Qur’an. While al-Suyuti has claimed, in his Itqan fi `Ulum al-Qur’an, twenty-one instances of naskh in the Qur’an, Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762) has only retained five of al-Suyuti’s twenty-one cases as genuine, stating that the rest can be reconciled. Another scholar, Abu Muslim al-1sfahani (d. 934) has, on the other hand, denied the incidence of abrogation in the Qur’an altogether. The majority of ulema have nevertheless acknowledged the incidence of naskh in the Qur’an on the authority of the Qur’an itself. This is the conclusion that the majority have drawn from the relevant Quranic passages. However, it will be noted that the counter-argument is also based on the same Qur’anic passages which have been quoted in support of naskh. The following two ayat need to be quoted again:
None of our revelations do We abrogate nor cause to be forgotten unless We substitute for them something better or similar [ma nansakh min ayatin aw nunsiha na’ti bi- khayrin minha aw mithliha] (al-Baqarah, 2:106).
Elsewhere we read in sura al-Nahl (16:106):
When We substitute one revelation for another, and God knows best what He reveals [wa idha baddalna ayatan makana ayatin wa’ Llahu a’lam bima yunazzil]. To some commentators, the word ‘ayah‘ to these passages refers, not to the text of the Qur’an itself, but to previous scriptures including the Torah and the Gospel. An interpretation of this type would, of course, render the ayah under discussion irrelevant to the occurrence of naskh in the Qur’an. Abu Muslim al-Isfahani, a Mu’tazili scholar and author of a Qur’an commentary (Jami al-Ta’wil), has held the view that all instances of so-called abrogation in the Qur’an are in effect no more than qualifications and takhsis of one text by another. To al-isfahani, the word ‘ayah’ in these passages means not a portion of the Qur’anic text, but ‘miracle’. To read this meaning in the first of the two passages quoted above would imply that God empowered each of His Messengers with miracles that none other possessed; that God provided each of His Messengers with superior miracles, one better than the other. That this is the correct meaning of the text is substantiated, al-Isfahani adds, by the subsequent portion of the same passage (i.e. al-Baqarah, 2:106) which reads: ‘Do you not know that God is all-powerful?’ (`ala kulli shay’in qadir). Thus this particular attribute of God relates more appropriately in this context to the subject of miracles rather than abrogation of one ayah by another. This interpretation finds further support in yet another portion of the same passage (i.e. 2:108) which provides in an address to the Muslim community: `Would you want to question your Prophet as Moses was questioned before?’ It is then explained that Moses was questioned by the Bani Isra’il regarding his miracles, not the abrogation as such? The word `ayah‘, in the second passage (i.e. al-Nahl, 16:101) too means ‘miracle’. For after all, ‘ayah‘ literally means ‘sign’ and a miracle is a sign. AI-Isfahani further argues: Naskh is equivalent to ibtal, that is, ‘falsification’ or rendering something invalid, and ibtal as such has no place in the Qur’an. This is what we learn from the Qur’an itself which reads in sura Ha-Mim (41:42): ‘No falsehood can approach it [the Book] from any direction [la ya’tihi al-batil min bayn yadayhi wa lamin khalfih].’ In response to this, however, it is said that naskh is not identical with ibtal; that naskh for all intents and purposes means suspension of a textual ruling, while the words of the text are often retained and not nullified.
Two other points that al-Isfahani has added to his interpretation are as follows. Supposing that the passages under consideration do mean abrogation, even then they do not confirm the actual occurrence of naskh but merely the possibility of it, and there is a difference between the two. Lastly, al-Isfahani maintains that all instances of conflict in the Qur’an are apparent rather than real, and can be reconciled and removed. This, he adds, is only logical of the Shari’ah, which is meant to be for all times; this is just another way of saying that it is not open to abrogation.
Having explained al-Isfahani’s refutation of the theory of naskh, it remains to be said that according to the majority of ulema, the occurrence of naskh in the Qur’an is proven, although not in so many instances as has often been claimed. The proponents of naskh have stated that the incidence of naskh in the Qur’an is proven, not only by the Qur’an itself, but also by a conclusive ijma. Anyone who opposes it is thus going against the dictates of ijma. In the face of the foregoing disagreements, it is admittedly difficult to see the existence of a conclusive ‘ijma’ on the point. But according to the rules of ijma`, once an ijma is properly concluded, any subsequent differences of opinion would not invalidate it. Divergent views such as that of al-Isfahani seem to have been treated in this light, and almost totally ignored.
In his book The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions For Islamic Methodology and Thought (originally a doctoral dissertation), Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman is critical of the classical approach to naskh and calls for a fresh and comprehensive understanding `of the technique of naskh […] on a systematic and conceptual basis, not a legalistic one’ The author is of the view that the classical exposition of naskh is unnecessarily restrictive as it tends to narrow down the ‘rich Islamic and Qur’anic experience’, and also indulges, in some instances at least, in a measure of exaggeration and excess.
The author maintains that abrogation was primarily an historical, rather than juridical, phenomenon and ought to have been read in that context. This may be part of the reason why the jurists have found it difficult to establish the validity of abrogation by the direct evidence of the Quran or Sunnah. The argument runs that the facts of naskh in regard to, for example, the ayah of the sword, as discussed below, were historical and were largely dictated by the prevailing pattern of relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims at the time. Now, instead of understanding naskh as a circumstance of history, the ulema turned it into a juridical doctrine of permanent validity. This classical concept of permanent abrogation is oblivious of the space-time element which, if taken into account, would have restricted the application of naskh to those circumstances alone.
The broad sweep of naskh was, however, taken so far as to invalidate a major portion of the Qur’an. This is precisely the case with regard to the ayah of the sword (ayah al-sayf) which reads, in the relevant part: `And fight the polytheists all together as they fight you all together, and know that God is with those who keep their duty [to Him]’ (al-Tawbah, 9:36). Influenced by the prevailing pattern of hostile relations with non-Muslims, ‘some jurists took an extreme position in interpreting this ayah,’ and claimed that it abrogated all preceding ayat pertaining to patience, tolerance and the right of others to self-determination. Although scholars are not in agreement as to the exact number of ayat that were abrogated as a result, Mustafa Abu Zayd has found that the ayah of the sword abrogated no less than 140 ayat in the holy Book. Jurists who were inclined to stress the aggressive aspect of jihad could only do so by applying abrogation to a large number of Quranic ayat, and using abrogation in this manner has, Abu Sulayman contests, ‘indeed narrowed the Qur’anic experience’ and undermined the egalitarian substance of its teachings. In many passages the Qur’an calls for peace, compassion and forgiveness, and promotes a set of moral values such as moderation, humility, patience and tolerance whose scope could not be said to be confined to relations among Muslims alone.
The Muslim jurists of the second hijrah century, as al-Zuhayli informs us, considered war as the norm, rather than the exception, in relations with non-Muslims, and they were able to do so partly because of a certain exaggeration in the use and application of naskh. The reason behind this attitude was the need, which was then prevalent, to be in a state of constant readiness for battle in order to protect Islam. Under such political circumstances, it is not difficult to understand how abrogation was utilised as a means by which to strengthen the morale of the Muslim in facing their enemies. It is to be noted further that the position of the classical jurists which characterised war as the permanent pattern of relationship with non-muslims, as al-Zuhayli points out,is not binding on anyone,and is not supported by the balance of evidence in the Quran and Sunnah.
It is therefore important, Abu Sulayman tells us, ‘to put the concept of naskh back in proper context’ and confine its application only to clear cases, such as the change of qiblah from the direction of Jerusalem to the Ka’bah. As for the rest, the rules and teachings of Islam are valid and applicable in unlimited combinations as they meet the needs and benefits of mankind, in the light of the broader values and objectives that the Quran and Sun n ah have upheld.
by M. H. Kamali.
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