7.1. TYPES OF NASKH
Abrogation may either be explicit (sarih), or implicit (dimni). In the case of explicit abrogation, the abrogating text clearly repeals one ruling and substitutes another in its place. The facts of abrogation, including the chronological order of the two rulings, the fact that they are genuinely in conflict, and the nature of each of the two rulings, and so forth, can be ascertained in the relevant texts. An example of this is the Hadith which provides: `I had forbidden you from visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for they remind you of the hereafter.
In another Hadith the Prophet is reported to have said, `I had forbidden you from storing away the sacrificial meat because of the large crowds. You may now store it as you wish. The initial order not to store the sacrificial meat during the eid festival (`id al-Adha) was given in view of the large number of visitors who attended the festival in Madinah, where the Prophet desired that they should be provided with necessary foodstuffs. The restriction was later removed as the circumstances had changed. In both these examples, the text leaves no doubt as to the nature of the two rulings and all the other relevant facts of abrogation. An example of explicit abrogation in the Qur’an is the passage in sura al-Baqarah (2: 142-144) with regard to the change in the direction of the qibla from Jerusalem to the Ka’bah. The relevant text of the Qur’an as to the direction of the qiblah before and after the new ruling is clear, and leaves no doubt with regard to the facts of abrogation and the nature of the change which was effected thereby.
In the case of implicit abrogation, the abrogating text does not clarify all the relevant facts. Instead we have a situation where the Lawgiver introduces a ruling which is in conflict with a previous ruling and the two cannot be reconciled, while it remains somewhat doubtful whether the two rulings present a genuine case for abrogation. An example of implicit abrogation is the ruling in sura al-Baqarah (2:180) which permitted bequests to one’s parents and relatives. This was subsequently abrogated by another text (al-Nisa, 4:11) which entitled the legal heirs to specific shares in inheritance. Notwithstanding the fact that the two rulings are not diametrically opposed to one another and could both be implemented in certain cases, the majority of ulema have held that the initial ruling which validated bequests to relatives has been abrogated by the rules of inheritance. They have held that the ayah of inheritance prescribes specific portions for legal heirs which can be properly implemented only if they were observed in their entirety, and that the Qur’anic scheme of inheritance is precise and self-contained, and any outside interference is likely to upset the individual shares as well as the overall balance between them. Since bequest to legal heirs is seen as a principal source of such interference it is totally forbidden. This analysis is substantiated by the explicit ruling of a Hadith in which the Prophet is reported to have said, `God has assigned a portion to all who are entitled. Hence there shall be no bequest to legal heirs.
Implicit abrogation has been sub-divided into two types, namely total abrogation (naskh kulli) and partial abrogation (naskh juzi). In the case of the former, the whole of a particular nass is abrogated by another, and a new ruling is enacted to replace it. This may be illustrated by a reference to the two Quranic texts concerning the waiting period (`iddah) of widows, which was initially prescribed to be one year but was subsequently changed to four months and ten days. The two texts are as follows:
Those of you who are about to die and leave widows should bequeath for their widows a year’s maintenance and residence; but if they leave the residence, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves (al-Baqarah, 2:240).
Those of you who die and leave widows, the latter must observe a waiting period of four months and ten days; when they have fulfilled their term, you are not responsible for what they do of themselves (al-Baqarah, 2:234)
As can be seen, the provision concerning the waiting period of widows in the first ayah has been totally replaced by the new ruling in the second. There is no doubt on the point that both of these rulings are exclusively concerned with the same subject, namely, the widows. Both ayat require them to observe a waiting period, whose length varies in each, and only one must be observed, not both. The two passages are thus in conflict and the latter abrogates the former. But this is a case, as already noted, of an implicit naskh, in that the two ayat do not expound, with complete clarity, all the facts of abrogation and it is not certain whether they are genuinely in conflict, for the term `a year’s maintenance and residence’ in the first ayah does not recur in the second. There is, in fact, no reference to either maintenance or residence in the second ayah. This would, for example, introduce an element of doubt concerning whether the two ayat are concerned with different subjects of maintenance and `iddah respectively. There is, in other words, a level of discrepancy which might make it possible to apply each of the two rulings to different situations. This is not to argue against the majority view which seems to be the settled law, but merely to explain why an abrogation of this type has been classified as implicit naskh.
Partial abrogation (naskh juz’i ) is a form of naskh in which one text is only partially abrogated by another, while the remaining part continues to be operative. An example of this is the Qur’anic ayah of qadhf (slanderous accusation) which has been partially repealed by the ayah of imprecation (li’an). The two texts are as follows:
Those who accuse chaste women [of adultery] and then fail to bring four witnesses to prove it shall be flogged with eighty lashes (al-Nur, 24:4).
Those who accuse their spouses and have no witnesses, other than their own words, to support their claim, must take four solemn oaths in the name of God and testify that they are telling the truth (al-Nur, 24:6).
The first ayah lays down the general rule that anyone, be it a spouse or otherwise, who accuses chaste women of zina must produce four witnesses for proof. The second ayah provides that if the accuser happens to be a spouse who cannot provide four witnesses and yet insists on pursuing the charge of zina, he may take four solemn oaths to take the place of four witnesses. This is to be followed, as the text continues, by a statement in which the husband invokes the curse of God upon himself if he tells a lie. The ruling of the first text has thus been repealed by the second text insofar as it concerns a married couple.
It will be noted that the text of the Qur’an has two distinctive features, namely, the words of the text, and the ruling, or the hukm, that it conveys. Reading and reciting the words of the Qur’an, even if its ruling is abrogated, still commands spiritual merit. The words are still regarded as part of the Qur’an and salah can be performed by reciting them. It is on the basis of this distinction between the words and the rulings of the Qur’an that naskh has once again been classified into three types. The first and the most typical variety of abrogation is referred to as naskh al-hukm, or naskh in which the ruling alone is abrogated while the words of the text are retained. All the examples which we have given so far of the incidence of naskh in the Qur’an fall into this category. Thus the words of the Qur’anic text concerning bequests to relatives (al-Baqarah, 2:180) and the one concerning the `iddah of widows (al-Baqarah, 2: 240) are still a part of the Qur’an despite the fact that they have both been abrogated. We still recite them as such, but do not apply the law that they convey. The other two varieties of naskh, respectively referred to as naskh al-tilawah (sometimes as naskh al-qira’ah), that is, abrogation of the words of the text while the ruling is retained, and naskh al-hukm wa al-tilawah, that is, abrogation of both the words and the ruling – are rather rare and the examples which we have are not supported by conclusive evidence. Having said this, however, we might add that, except for a minority of Mu’tazili scholars, the ulema are generally in agreement on the occurrence of abrogation in both these forms. An example of naskh al-tilawah is the passage which, according to a report attributed to `Umar b. Al- Khattab, was a part of the Qur’an, although the passage in question does not appear in the standard text. However the ruling conveyed by the passage in question still represents authoritative law. The reported version of this text provides: `When a married man or a married woman commits zina, their punishment shall be stoning as a retribution ordained by God.
In the event where the words of the text, and the law that they convey, are both repealed, then the text in question is of little significance. According to a report which is attributed to the Prophet’s widow, `A’ishah, it had been revealed in the Qur’an that ten clear suckings by a child, make marriage unlawful between that child and others who drank the same, woman’s milk. Then it was abrogated and substituted by five suckings and it was then that the Messenger of God died. The initial ruling which required ten suckings was read into the text of the Qur’an. The ruling was then repealed and the words in which it was conveyed were also omitted from the text. However since neither of these reports is established by tawatur, they are not included in the Qur’an. The position now, according to the majority of ulema, is that either five clear suckings, or any amount which reaches the stomach, even if it be one large sucking, constitutes the grounds of prohibition.
According to the majority (jumhur) view, the Qur’an and the Sunnah may be abrogated by themselves or by one another. In this sense, abrogation may be once again classified into the following varieties: (1) Abrogation of the Qur’an by the Qur’an, which has already been illustrated. (2) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Sunnah. This too has been illustrated by the two ahadith which we quoted under the rubric of explicit abrogation. (3) Abrogation of the Qur’an by Sunnah. An example of this is the ayah of bequest in sura al-Baqarah (2:180) which has been abrogated by the Hadith which provides that `there shall be no bequest to an heir’. It is generally agreed that the Qur’an itself does not abrogate the ayah of bequest and there remains little doubt that it has been abrogated by the Sunnah‘. (4) Abrogation of the Sunnah by the Qur’an. An example of this is the initial ruling of the Prophet which determined the qiblah in the direction of Jerusalem. When the Prophet migrated to Madinah, he ordered the believers to pray in the direction of Jerusalem. This was later repealed by the Qur’an (al-Baqarah, 2:144) which ordered the Muslims to turn their faces toward the holy mosque of the Ka’bah. The Qur’an, in other words, abrogated a practice that was initially authorised by the Sunnah.
The main exception to the foregoing classification of naskh is taken by Imam Shafi’i, the majority of the Mu’tazilah, and Ahmad b. Hanbal (according to one of two variant reports), who have validated the first two types of abrogation, but have overruled the validity of the remaining two. In their view, abrogation of the Quran by the Sunnah and vice versa is not valid. This is the conclusion that al-Shafi’i has drawn from his interpretation of a number of Quranic ayat where it is indicated that the Quran can only be abrogated by the Quran itself. Thus we read in sura al-Nahl (16:101):
And when We substitute one ayah in place of another ayah [ayatun makana ayatin], and God knows best what He reveals. This text, according to al-Shafi`i, is self-evident on the point that an ayah of the Qur’an can only be abrogated or replaced by another ayah. The fact that the ayah occurs twice in this text provides conclusive evidence that the Qur’an may not be abrogated by the Sunnah. In another place, the Qur’an reads: None of our revelations do We abrogate [ma nansakh min ayatin] or cause to be forgotten unless We substitute for them something better or similar (at-Baqarah,2:106).
The text in this ayah is once again clear on the point that in the matter of naskh, the Qur’an refers only to itself. The Qur’an, in other words, is self-contained in regard to naskh, and this precludes the possibility of it being abrogated by the Sunnah. Naskh in the Qur’an, according to al-Shafi’i, is a wholly internal phenomenon, and there is no evidence in the Qur’an to suggest that it can be abrogated by the Sunnah. Indeed the Qur’an asks the Prophet to declare that he himself cannot change any part of the Qur’an. This is the purport of the text in sura Yunus (10:1 5) which provides: `Say: it is not for me to change it of my own accord. I only follow what is revealed to me.’ It is thus not within the Prophet’s terms of reference to abrogate the Qur’an at his own initiative. ‘The Sunnah in principle’, writes al-Shafi`i, ‘follows, substantiates, and clarifies the Qur’an; it does not seek to abrogate the Book of God. All this al-Shafi’i adds, is reinforced in yet another passage in the Qur’an where it is provided: ‘God blots out or confirms what He pleases. With Him is the Mother of the Book’ (al-Ra’d, 13: 39). The reference here is again to naskh and the source in which it originates is the Mother of the Book, that is the Qur’an itself. The Sunnah, even the Mutawatir Sunnah, may not abrogate the Qur’an. AI-Shafi’i is equally categorical on the other limb of this theory, namely that the Qur’an does not abrogate the Sunnah either. Only the Sunnah can abrogate the Sunnah: Mutawatir by Mutawatir and Ahad by Ahad. Mutawatir may abrogate the Ahad, but there is some disagreement on whether the Ahad can abrogate the Mutawatir. According to the preferred view, which is also held by al-Shafi’i, the Ahad, however, can abrogate the Mutawatir. To illustrate this, al-Shafi’i refers to the incident when the congregation of worshippers at the mosque of Quba’ were informed by a single person (khabar al-upon it and turned their faces toward the Ka’bah. The fact that Jerusalem was the qiblah had been established by continuous, or mutawatir, Sunnah, but the congregation of Companions accepted the solitary report as the abrogation of Mutawatir.
Al-Shafi’i elaborates his doctrine further. If there existed any occasion for the Sunnah to abrogate the Qur’an or vice versa, the Prophet would be the first to say so. Thus in all cases where such an abrogation is warranted, there is bound to be a Sunnah of the Prophet to that effect, in which case the matter automatically becomes a part of the Sunnah. The Sunnah in other words is self-contained, and covers all possible cases of conflict and abrogation of the Qur’an by the Sunnah and vice versa. If any Sunnah is meant to be abrogated, the Prophet himself would do it by virtue of another Sunnah, hence there is no case for the abrogation of Sunnah by the Qur’an.
Al-Shafi’i considers it necessary for the abrogation of Sunnah that the Prophet should have informed the people specifically about it. If the Qur’an were to abrogate the Sunnah, while the Prophet has not indicated such to be the case, then, to give an example, all the varieties of sale which the Prophet had banned prior to the revelation of the Qur’anic ayah on the legality of sale (al-Baqarah, 2:275) would be rendered lawful with the revelation of this ayah. Similarly, the punishment of stoning for zina which is authorised by the Prophet would be deemed abrogated by the variant ruling of one hundred lashes in sura al-Nur (24:2). In the case of theft, too, the Prophet did not punish anyone for theft below the value of one-quarter of a dinar, nor did he apply the prescribed punishment to the theft of unguarded (ghayr muhraz) property. These would all be deemed abrogated following the revelation of the ayah in sura al- Ma’idah (5:83) which prescribes mutilation of the hand for theft without any qualification whatsoever. If we were to open this process, it would be likely to give rise to unwarranted claims of conflict and a fear of departure from the Sunnah.
Notwithstanding the strong case that al-Shafi’i has made in support of his doctrine, the majority opinion, which admits abrogation of the Qur’an and Sunnah by one another is preferable, as it is based on the factual evidence of having actually taken place. AI-Ghazali is representative of the majority opinion on this when he writes that identity of source (tajanus) is not necessary in naskh. The Qur’an and Sunnah may abrogate one another as they issue both from the same provenance. While referring to al-Shafi’i’s doctrine, al-Ghazali comments: `how can we sustain this in the face of the evidence that the Qur’an never validated Jerusalem as the qiblah; it was validated by the Sunnah, but its abrogating text occurs in the Quran? Likewise, the fasting of `Ashura’ was abrogated by the Qur’anic provision concerning the fasting of Ramadan while the former was only established by the Sunnah. Furthermore, the Qur’anic ayah which permitted conjugal intercourse at night-time in Ramadan (al-Baqarah, 2:178) abrogated the prohibition that the Sunnah had previously imposed on conjugal relations during Ramadan’.
by M. H. Kamali.
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