6.1. COMMANDS
A command proper (amr) is defined as a verbal demand to do something issued from a position of superiority over who is inferior. Command in this sense differs from both supplication (du`a’) and request (iltimas) in that the former is a demand from an inferior to one who is superior, whereas a request is a demand among people of equal or near-equal status. Since a verbal command can mean different things, namely an obligatory order, a mere recommendation, or even permissibility, the ulema have differed as to which of these is the primary and which the secondary meaning of a command. Some have held the view that amr is in the nature of a homonym (mushtarak) which imparts all of these meanings. Others have held that amr partakes in only two of these concepts, namely obligation and recommendation, but not permissibility. Still others have held that amr implies a permission to do something and that this is the widest meaning of amr, which is common to all three of the foregoing concepts.
According to the majority opinion, however, a command by itself, that is, when it is not attended by clues or circumstances that might give it a particular meaning, implies obligation or an emphatic demand only. But this may change in the event of other indications being present, which might reduce a command to permissibility, recommendation, or indeed to a variety of other meanings. Thus when we read in the Qur’an commands such as kulu wa’shrabu (`eat and drink’) (al-A’raf, 7:31), the indications are that they amount to no more than permissibility (Ibahah). For eating and drinking are the necessities of human life, and a command in respect of them must logically amount to a permissibility only. Similarly the Qur’anic permission in respect of hunting after the completion of the hajj ceremonies given in sura al-Ma’idah (5:2 – wa idha halaltum fastadu) and its address to the believers to ‘scatter in the land’ (fa’ntashiru fi’l-ard) after performing the Friday prayers (al-Jumu`ah, 62:10) are both in the imperative form. But in both cases the purpose is to render these activities permissible only.
A command may likewise convey a recommendation should there be indications to warrant this conclusion. This is, for example, the case with regard to the Qur’anic command which requires the documentation of loans: `When you give or take a loan for a fixed period, reduce it into writing’ (al-Baqarah, 2:282). However, from an indication which occurs in the next ayah in the same sura, it is concluded that the command here implies a recommendation (nadb) only. This ayah reads: `and if one of you deposits a thing on trust, let the trustee [faithfully] discharge his trust’. Here the use of the word ‘trust’ (amanah) signifies that the creditor may trust the debtor even without any writing. The majority of ulema have held the same view regarding the requirement of witnesses in commercial contracts, which is the subject of another Qur’anic command occurring in the same passage, known as the ayah al-mudayanah (2: 282): ‘Whenever you enter a contract of sale, let it be witnessed and let neither the scribe nor the witness suffer harm.’ The Zahiri ulema have upheld the obvious meaning of these provisions and have made documentation a requirement of every loan, or any form of deferred payment, and have made witnesses a requirement of every contract of sale. This, in their view, is more conducive to the fulfillment of contracts and the prevention of disputes among people.
A command may, according to the indications provided by the context and circumstances, imply a threat, such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers: ‘Do what you wish’ (i`malu ma shi’tum-al-Nur, 24: 33) and to the devil: ‘Lead to destruction those that you can’ (wastafziz man intata’ta) (Bani Isra’il, 17:64). A command may similarly imply contempt (ihanah) such as the Qur’anic address to the unbelievers on the Day of Judgment: ‘Taste [the torture], you mighty and honourable!’ A command may sometimes imply supplication when someone says, for example, `O Lord grant me forgiveness’, and indeed a host of other meanings which may be understood in the light of the context and surrounding circumstances. As already noted, the majority of ulema have held that a command normally conveys an obligation unless there are indications to suggest otherwise.
The Lawgiver may at times order something which has hitherto been prohibited. The question then arises as to the nature of a command which follows a prohibition (al-amr ba’d al-hazar); does it convey an obligation or a mere permissibility? The majority of ulema have held the view that a command following a prohibition means permissibility, not obligation. Two examples of such a command in the Qur’an have already been given above in the context of the permission to hunt following its prohibition during the hajj ceremonies and the permission to conduct trade following its prohibition at the time of the Friday prayers (al-Ma’idah, 5:2; and al-Jumu’ah, 62:10 respectively) An example of such a command in the Sunnah is the Hadith in which the Prophet is reported to have said: ‘I had forbidden you from ,visiting the graves. Nay, visit them, for it reminds you of the hereafter’.
The next question which arises in this connection is whether a command requires a single compliance or repetition. According to the majority view, this question can only be determined in the light of indication, which might specify that repeated performance is required. However in the absence of such indications, a single instance of performance is the minimum requirement of a command. Among the indications which determine repetition is when a command is issued in conditional terms. For example, the Qur’anic provision `if you are impure then clean yourselves’ (al-Ma’idah, 5:7), or the text which provides: ‘The adulterer and adulteress, flog them each one hundred lashes’, that is, if they commit adultery (al-Nur, 24:2). Since the command to take a bath in the first ayah is conditional on janabah, that is, on sexual intercourse, then a bath must be taken following every instance of sexual intercourse. Similarly when a command is dependent on a cause or an attribute, then it must be fulfilled whenever the cause or the attribute is present. The Qur’anic command, for example, which reads: `Perform the salah at the decline of the sun’ (Bani Isra’il, 17:18), requires repeated performance at every instance when the cause for it is present, that is, when the specified time of salah arrives.
As for the question whether a command requires immediate or delayed performance, it is once again observed that the command itself merely consists of a demand, and the manner of its performance must be determined in the light of indications and surrounding circumstances. When, for example, A tells B to ‘do such and such now’, or alternatively orders him to `do such and such tomorrow’, both orders are valid and there is no contradiction. However, if a command were to require immediate execution then the word `now’ In the first order would be superfluous just as the word `tomorrow’ in the second order would be contradictory. When a person commands another to `bring me some water’ while he is thirsty, then by virtue of this indication, the command requires immediate performance just as the order to ‘collect the rent’ when it is given, say, in the middle of the month while the rent is collected at the end of each month, must mean delayed performance.
It is thus obvious that the commandant may specify a particular time in which the command must be executed. The time limit may be strict or it may be flexible. If it is flexible, like the command to perform the obligatory salah, then performance may be delayed until the last segment of the prescribed time. But if the command itself specifies no time limit, such as the order to perform an expiation (kaffarah), then execution may be delayed indefinitely within the expected limits of one’s lifetime. However, given the uncertainty of the time of one’s death, an early performance is recommended,, regard to kaffarat.
And lastly the question arises as to whether a command to do something implies the prohibition of its opposite. According to the majority view, a command to do something does imply the prohibition of its opposite regardless as to whether the opposite in question consists of a single act or of a plurality of acts. Thus when a person is ordered to move, he is in the meantime forbidden to remain still; or when a person is ordered to stand, he is forbidden from doing any of a number of opposing acts such as sitting, crouching, lying down, etc. However, some ulema, including al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Hajib and the Mu’tazilah, have held that a command does not imply the prohibition of its opposite. A group of the Hanafi and Shafi’i ulema have held that only one of the several opposing acts, whether known or unknown, is prohibited, but not all. The result of such differences would obviously have a bearing on whether the person who commits the opposite of a command must be penalized, and if so, to what extent. Specific answers to such questions can obviously only be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances and the state of mind of the individual concerned, as well as the general objectives of the Lawgiver/commander that can be ascertained in a given command.
by M. H. Kamali.
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